The intellectual and political climate of our own times places specific limitations on how we regard the differences between us: differences in terms of culture, class, gender, individual abilities, and so on. In this paper, I am particularly concerned with culture as a label for one set of differences, and the impact of this on the study of action. Traditionally, 'the individual' (on some conception of this term) has been the domain of psychology.
1 This designation, then, made 'culture', or that which lies 'outside' the individual, a question for psychology. Projects aimed at addressing this issue led to various attempts to create a truly 'cultural psychology' or to socialize the subject of psychology. More recently, we are increasingly reminded that the study of mind (or brain) is diminished to the degree that we consider only what is 'inside' the individual and not the total context of action or communication. I want to re-examine these forces impinging on the study of action because I believe psychology is not yet rid of the old opposition mind versus culture. By way of introduction, I want to motivate a framework for the study of action that omits culture and the individual as variables, but which allows for turning culture into an empirical question, and a possible theory; a theory that must stand its ground against other, competing (biological, or psychological) theories.
In section 1, I use a recent review of 'theories linking culture and psychology' (Cooper & Denner, 1998) to discuss particular muddles that seem to underlie our thinking about the context of action; and in section 2, I present my research programme for the study of action-in-context. My concern is not with theories of culture, as such, or with the latest models in this regard; rather, my focus is on a possible way around the ongoing difficulties we seemingly have with culture-psychologically speaking. One needs only to consider a relatively recent review purporting to 'link' culture and psychological phenomena, or glance through the titles of papers in the Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology, to find ample evidence of these difficulties. Note, therefore, that this paper is not a review of the literature on culture, multiculturalism, various (old and new) models of culture, and theories purportedly 'linking' culture and psychology (cf. D'Andrade, 1981; Durham, 1990; Geertz, 1973; Ingleby, 2000; Jahoda, 1982; Miller, 1984; Tomasello, 1999 ; also Cooper and Denner's [1998] references). Rather, I want to lay the ground for a framework for the study of action, in section 1, and outline the framework in section 2, below. The former takes us through typical muddles as far as attempts to think and link culture and the individual go, and the latter takes us to the heart of the empirical reality before us.
The primary motivation for this task comes from excitement at the possibilities offered by work on situated, distributed, extended or embedded and embodied cognition (cf. Clark, 1999; Hutchins, 1995) -work that attempts to re-unite brains, bodies, words and worlds. As Andy Clark (2001) puts it:
. . . it is a mistake to posit a biologically fixed 'human nature' with a simple 'wrap-around' of tools and culture. For the tools and culture are indeed as much determinants of our nature as products of it. Ours are (by nature) unusually plastic brains whose biologically proper functioning has always involved the recruitment and exploitation of non-biological props and scaffolds. More so than any other creature on the planet, we humans are natural-born cyborgs, factory tweaked and primed so as to participate in cognitive and computational architectures whose bounds far exceed those of skin and skull. (p. 138) What lies outside 'skin and skull', I want to ask, or how are we to access the situated, extended or distributed nature of our actions? From a cross-cultural psychological viewpoint, the answer to what is outside 'skin and skull' is culture (on some conception of this term). Moreover, the most typical methodological framework for the traditional study of mind and culture is captured in the equation y = f (x), which is discussed below (cf. Triandis & Suh, 2002) . Vygotsky (1978) , and those following on from him (such as Jaan Valsiner), have consistently challenged this answer and also the methodological framework. The point of this challenge is, briefly, that mind/ brain/human nature is not independent of culture/the natural and social environment, and that, methodologically speaking, the S-R (or stimulusresponse) framework is inadequate to the task of studying typically human actions (cf. Craig, 2000 , for a discussion of this challenge). In the words of Clark (above), 'it is a mistake to posit a biologically fixed "human nature" with a simple "wrap-around" of tools and culture'. So far so good, one is tempted to say, but how are we, then, to think (conceptualize), study (empirically) and explain the seeming differences between us-differences that apparently emphasize the impact of culture on psychological abilities? In other words, it is not good enough to re-think what we mean by culture, psychological phenomena and the interaction between these, and, more overarchingly, what is 'in' and 'outside' the mind or individual, unless this thinking permeates right through from conceptualization to methodology to theory: a point already made by Vygotsky (1978) .
Vygotsky's project does, however, still promote the development of a ('truly') cultural psychology-a project I want to both acknowledge and side-step, as it were. To put it perhaps too strongly: I believe that even thinking in terms of a cultural psychology is already to lose the phenomena before us. This is not, however, to say that the study of action should omit culture, but, rather, as I will argue shortly, that culture-ing and mind-ing (to turn 'culture' and 'mind' into verbs) permeate action such that these two levels of analysis cannot be separated as if they are different kinds of action. Actions are, I want to argue, actions, and cannot be thought of in terms of 'cultural actions' versus, or even 'linked' to, 'psychological actions'. Phrased differently, there is nothing to link as far as the study of action goes, but clearly a call to find a way of studying action-in-context. This view commits me to find a definition of culture that allows us to drop this lowlevel theory (culture as a causal explanation of action) from our generation of data. This is not to say, however, that I want to argue that psychological phenomena are a-cultural, or that 'culture'-on a very specific conceptioncannot become an empirical or suggested theory of explanation. I clarify this in section 1, below.
The task facing those interested in the context of action means, therefore, that we have to reconsider the whole package with which we engage action (cf. Kirsh, 1996 , which I consider consistent with the proposals I will present in section 2, below). Unless we do so, our thinking will tend to be pulled back by the old and odd dichotomy between culture and mind, which is still alive and well-judging from the review of Cooper and Denner (1998) , to which we turn shortly.
In what follows I, first, discuss a recent review of attempts to conceptualize culture, for psychological purposes, as well as the muddles typical of the separation. Second, I present various moves (conceptual, methodological and theoretical) in the process of answering the question: What lies outside 'skin and skull', or how are we to access the situated, extended or distributed nature of our actions? CRAIG: CULTURE AND THE INDIVIDUAL 631
Culture from a Psychological Perspective
Cooper and Denner (1998) review 'seven theories linking culture and psychology ' (p. 559) . In these, culture is respectively defined in terms of: core societal values; context; caste; capital; a set of universally adaptive tools; inter-group relations; and a dynamic psychological construct (p. 578). The explanatory aim in each case is the influence of culture (on some conception of it, e.g. core societal values, such as variation on the individualism-collectivism continuum) on one or the other psychological phenomena (e.g. intelligence, personality). I do not want to discuss any of these theories, as such; Cooper and Denner do this well. Rather, I want to point to specific problems underlying the kind of thinking embodied in the various attempts to 'link' culture and psychology, as well as in the position that 'psychologists should omit cultural processes from consideration in their theoretical or empirical work' (Cooper & Denner, 1998, p. 578) .
I agree with much in Cooper and Denner's analysis of the problems with culture in psychological research. For example, it is well worth considering their points regarding treating demographic variables, within nations, 'categorically as quasi-independent variables to assess differences between groups' (p. 560); and 'treating cultures as static and/or unchanging' (p. 561). I do not, however, agree with where they think the solution lies: 'searching for new models of culture' to cope with specific 'demographic, economic and political changes ' (p. 561) . In this regard, my reasoning is as follows: as long as we regard psychological phenomena as (more or less) 'inside' the individual, and cultural phenomena as 'outside', we remain trapped in the old equation or division between 'mind', on the one hand, and 'culture', on the other. Phrased differently, once separated, culture and mind become names for problems to which old and new definitions, and new models of culture, such as discussed by Cooper and Denner, cannot be the solution. As such, I use this review, and my critical comments regarding the ideas contained in it, as a springboard for an alternative framework for the study of action. And, as already stated, Vygotsky laid the tracks for moving away from separating culture and mind, as did G.H. Mead, John Dewey, William James and C.S. Peirce (cf. Innis, 1994) . Moreover, these ideas have been explored and extended by a number of more recent authors (e.g. Cole, 1996; Cole & Scribner, 1974; Cole, Valsiner, Engelström, Branco, & Vasquez, 1998; Shotter, 1993; Valsiner, 1998; Wertsch, 1985) . I aim at something else, however: to focus on action as such. That is to say, to find a way to talk about culture that does not turn it into a kind of action, but rather lets it stand as a more or less validated theory of patterns in action. The first position I have to fend off has to do with those who believe culture can be omitted from the study of action. Cooper and Denner (1998) conclude their discussion of the seven theories THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13 (5) 632 of culture and psychological processes within nations (pp. 564-578) with the following summary of the state of things outside the seven theories:
Of course, some critics [of attempts to link culture and psychology] assert that psychologists should omit cultural processes from consideration in their theoretical or empirical work. Psychology, they argue, is primarily about understanding the behavior of individuals, not of groups; the most important psychological processes and mechanisms are universal, while environmental variation helps little to explain individual functioning. Some take an alternative position, arguing that historical and societal processes are so powerful in creating distinctive communities, institutional systems, and contexts that individual meanings become trivial and that meaningful comparisons across cultural communities become impossible. (p. 578) I think it is fair to say that the theories reviewed by Cooper and Denner, their proposed solution and the passage quoted above capture a great deal of what is still muddled in thinking about culture from the perspective of psychology. I say 'still' because enough scholarly work exists to have moved our thinking away from simplistic conceptions of culture and the individual. It is therefore informative to take a closer look at these muddles, before moving on to my proposals for the study of action. For example, oppositions such as those made in the quotation between the behaviour of individuals and that of groups-where only the latter are seemingly thought of as involving culture-between universal and particular (cultural) patterns, and between cultural patterns and individual meanings are highly problematic.
(a) What is Wrong with the Ideas Discussed by Cooper and Denner and Those Summarized in the Quotation Above?
Traditionally, the relationship between psychology and culture (or mind and culture) has been expressed by the formula y = f (x), where y is some psychological phenomon, and x some cultural phenomenon (cf. Sternberg, 1982, p. 642 ). This, it was thought, allowed the researcher to obtain/generate data on one or both sides of the equation in order to draw inferences, for example, about the effect of culturally organized experience on problemsolving skills or intelligence (or to explain differences in IQ scores according to cultural differences). This formulation was not regarded as being without problems, though; as the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition (LCHC) puts it: 'Not the least of our difficulties arises because the phenomena we seek to designate as culture and intelligence are by no means well specified. Definitions of both terms abound' (Sternberg, 1982, p. 642) . (Cf. Sternberg & Kaufman, 1998 , for a discussion of the question of what intelligence is; Cooper & Denner, 1998 , for culturally specific views on intelligence; and Cole, 1996 , for an update on what cultural psychology could be.)
The first misconception that deserves comment has to do with the implied dichotomy between culture and the individual (cf. Miller, 1984 , for an elegant resolution of this). This dichotomy leads to attempts to tinker with each side of the equation, so to speak, as is amply illustrated in the paper by Cooper and Denner. Moreover, unless the separation of culture and mind is first attended to conceptually, empirically and theoretically, we cannot move on to a more fruitful way of making sense of human action and differences in this regard across time and place, or individually and across groups. I present my solution to this in section 2, below.
Another muddle in attempts to link culture and psychological phenomena has to do with the opposition between the behaviour of individuals and that of a group. The telling part in the quotation above is the following: 'Psychology . . . is primarily about understanding the behavior of individuals, not of groups; the most important psychological processes and mechanisms are universal, while environmental variation helps little to explain individual functioning.' Even if we agree that 'Psychology . . . is primarily about understanding the behavior of individuals, not of groups', this still does not mean that the behaviour of individuals could or should be explained solely in terms of universal-biological-terms. My point is that, as explanations for the behaviour of individuals, culture and biology represent different levels of analysis, open to specific objections in particular cases, but that neither one necessarily rules out the other. More about reductionism shortly. Further, and implied by this statement, we may well ask: in what possible sense could we regard the behaviour or action of individuals as a-cultural, and culture as devoid of individual's habits, abilities and interests? Moreover, if psychological processes and mechanisms are thought to be universal, they are still not necessarily a-cultural, but, rather, best thought of in terms of the biological capacities or the evolutionary gains of the species (e.g. walking upright, on two legs); capacities that come into play in a particular context (e.g. walking in a desert searching for food, or walking in a city trying to find an internet café).
Biological explanations, as is also the case with historical (or cultural) and psychological (or developmental) explanations, are different kinds of abstractions. That is to say, the complex whole of action in a particular context allows for any one or all three of these kinds of explanations (e.g. biological, historical and psychological). That some such explanation brings to the fore the issue of the employment of universal abilities within specific circumstances, or the particular manifestations of those abilities (an important issue for the study of the differences between us, which is also mentioned by Cooper and Denner), does not suggest that one kind of explanation rules out, or makes superfluous, the other kinds. Competing explanations, or what I would prefer to call different levels of analysis, bring to the fore the issue of reductionism.
Reductionism, in general, comes in many shapes and sizes; it is therefore important to distinguish between different senses of this term. Apart from the kind that threatens to reduce everything, all at once, to basic, mechanistic causes (one that is hard to come by-cf. Dawkins, 1991, p. 13) , there are others, such as the ontological theses of individualism (where social states are thought to reduce to psychological states) and materialism (where psychological states are thought to reduce to neuro-physiological states). The former allows social scientists concerned with action to ignore culture or reduce such variation to individual, psychological mechanisms. The latter, in turn, allows explanations to penetrate beyond culture and the individual to, ultimately, the molecular level (cf. Wilson, 1998) . More often reductionism seems to express an empirical prediction 'that developed psychological theories ultimately will stand in the inter-theoretic reduction relation . . . to developed counterpart theories from cognitive and computational neuroscience' (Bickle, 1996, p. 56) . As far as our present discussion goes, reducing variation to an assumed cultural homogeneity (e.g. all women are the same and essentially different from men, and likewise for people of colour versus the rest) presents another kind of reductionism; let us call this culturism. This form of reductionism in social sciences is more or less related to relativism (that all beliefs, claims and actions can only be evaluated-in situ-in the contexts in which they belong).
2 I believe that reductionism as an empirical prediction that one or the other theory will come to stand in the inter-theoretic reduction relation to another-given new ways of thinking or perhaps better evidence for one or the other theoryremoves the sting out of the fear that psychology, history or biology will cease to allow for a better grasp of the things before us.
The point of this brief introduction to the various forms of reductionism is to open the ground for claiming that, given the state of our knowledge about ourselves, it seems prudent to think of human action as inevitably constrained and enabled by biological, historical and psychological factors (or that these domains of analysis contain both limits on, and are rich in resources for, action). The kind of explanation searched for should, thus, rather be tied to the kind of project engaged in, not the view that some parts of action are only biological, others cultural, and yet others psychological. This means that I think of action as the result of, or as caused by, biological, historical and psychological factors-until one explanation rules out the others on the basis of, for example, better evidence (cf. Bickle, 1996) . Moreover, it is with this in mind that I present, in section 1(b), a definition of culture for the empirical study of action, one that seems less loaded with confusions.
The last muddle that I want to highlight in our thinking about culture from a psychological perspective has to do with arguing that 'historical and societal processes are so powerful in creating distinctive communities, institutional systems, and contexts that individual meanings become trivial and that meaningful comparisons across cultural communities become impossible' (Cooper & Denner, 1998, p. 578) . The problem here is twofold (excluding the opposition between 'historical and societal processes' and 'individual meanings' because this is just the y = f (x) in new terms and, as such, already discussed). The 'power of historical and societal processes' does not entail either the triviality of 'individual meanings' or the impossibility of meaningful comparisons across cultural communities. First things first. What are we to make of 'individual meanings' (emphasis mine)? Are these some kind of a-historical, a-social private language or set of associations? This makes no sense. Second, the possibility of comparison across life-worlds takes us to the heart of debates about relativism and whether stable, objective, universal standards for comparison make sense. Elsewhere (Craig, 2001 ) I argue against a strong multiculturalist thesis regarding knowledge, by which I mean all proposals regarding an inevitable link between culture and knowledge.
3 I do not want to repeat this here, suffice it to draw attention to three crucial insights in this regard; insights about change, adaptation and communication, which motivate against a strong multicultural thesis. On the basis of the facts of (individual, group and societal) change, adaptation (to alien and unfamiliar practices or demands) and communication (across different contexts and languages), I argue that we have no reason to believe that people are locked into their historical or cultural positions. These facts point, at least, to a distinction between background beliefs and empirical evidence for or against beliefs and, as such, give support to a position contrary to relativism (cf. Haack, 1993 Haack, , 1998 . I therefore believe that meaningful comparisons across life-worlds are indeed possible. I leave it at that, and move on to issues that seem hidden behind our problems with culture.
(b) Problems with Culture
We are confronted with a number of political and other problems when trying to think about ourselves, about who we are, or about our commitments and identifications, to use the two central terms of Charles Taylor's (1989) description of identity. Psychology or the social sciences on their high modernist mission to describe and explain universal processes and mechanisms were freed from concerns about the other. Since about the middle of the 20th century, however, we have been increasingly sensitized to the concerns of those too often excluded from our definitions of human (cf. Rorty, 1998) . Moreover, in a postmodern vein, we tend to be suspicious of meta-narratives and thus uncomfortable with unifying and totalizing concepts (cf. Bernstein, 1983) . Accompanying these changes are the so-called 'politics of recognition', for example feminist and multicultural positions regarding knowledge, identity, and so forth (cf. Appiah & Gutmann, 1996; Gutmann, 1994; Taylor, 1992) .
The postmodern project (if this is not already to violate the force of the distinct strands so labelled) tends to draw our talk closer to the particular, away from conceptualization, abstraction and high modernity's theoretical THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13 (5) 636 ambitions (cf. Toulmin, 1990) . From this perspective, the modern period's dream of universal standards with which to adjudicate between differences is increasingly found wanting (cf. Lyotard, 1984) . These ongoing debates affect our discussion about culture and psychological phenomena in a number of ways. We note, for example, these postmodern stresses in the Cooper and Denner review, in the idea that 'meaningful comparisons across cultural communities become impossible'-a claim I dispute. Further, and more pertinent for my argument, is that it is no longer tenable to talk about 'essences', for example of cultures as static, stable and consisting of homogeneous groups, more or less fixed in specific geographical locales. Globalization, and the manner in which the local is no longer isolated from other locales (Giddens, 1990) , further explodes the myth of isolated cultural communities. This means that I am tempted in the direction of the particular (the study of action, as such), but want to stop short of refusing to theorize patterns in actions (in terms of biological, cultural or psychological explanations). To attempt to achieve a balance between these aims is the task I face in section 2, below.
Psychologically speaking, these shifts in our thinking about ourselves mean that explanations of the similarities and differences between us are rarely unselfconsciously couched in terms of universal abilities. Exceptions to this trend are evolutionary (psychological) theories (Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Dawkins, 1989 Dawkins, , 1991 , and also the demand for access to universal human rights. My point is that both politically and epistemically we are directed towards recognizing differences and the particular natural or social circumstances/context of individuals and groups. This might, for some, privilege (renewed) attention to the influence of culture on psychological phenomena. We are also, however, pulled away from concepts that serve to homogenize differences, that is, culture as a label of some or other essence that serves to distinguish one group from another (e.g. all black people are the same and different from all white people). The latter is the call I want to heed.
In order to find a way around these difficulties, I want to present Richard Rorty's definition of culture, also his ideas about confusions between rationality and cultural differences, because I believe these offer us productive possibilities for the study of action in context. Definitions of 'culture' abound-not only in the Cooper and Denner paper discussed here, but also across the literature in social sciences and psychology. I will not review these here. I chose Rorty's definition because I believe it gives us the conceptual basis on which to avoid some of the muddles in our thinking about culture, psychologically speaking (as discussed above). Rorty (1998) He proposes this neutral, if you like, definition of culture to get us out of some destructive habits of thought about self and others; habits that have a great deal to do, according to him, with believing that some cultures are more rational than others and, therefore, superior. (This belief may also underlie those projects aimed at assessing 'the cultural part' of intelligent behaviour or the comparison of the performances of different 'cultures' on some or other task, e.g. intelligence tests.) For Rorty, 'questions about rationality and cultural differences boil down to questions about the relation between rationality1 and rationality3' (p. 188, emphasis mine). He defines the former as 'the ability to cope with the environment by adjusting one's reactions to environmental stimuli in complex and delicate ways' (p. 186)-an ability squids, amoebas and language-using humans all have, according to Rorty. Interesting to note that this definition accords well with Sternberg and Kaufman's recent (1998) view on intelligence: 'the ability to adapt to, shape, and select environments to accomplish one's goals and those of one's society and culture' (p. 494). Rationality3, again, is for Rorty 'roughly synonymous with tolerance-with the ability not to be overly disconcerted by differences from oneself, not to respond aggressively to such differences' (p. 186). Furthermore, '[i]t is a virtue', according to Rorty, 'that enables individuals and communities to coexist peacefully with other individuals and communities, living and letting live, and to put together new, syncretic, compromise ways of life' (p. 187). He wants to drop that sense of rationality (rationality2) that trades on the old distinction between human beings and brutes. (This distinction, too, is one on which psychology-as the scientific study of the psyche, or processes and mechanisms 'in' the individual-trades. We return to this below.) Along similar lines to his treatment of different senses to rationality, Rorty identifies three senses to the term 'culture'. The first, culture1, revolves, for him, around shared habits of action (as already quoted above); habits that adapt members of a single community to their environment and that enable them to get along. It is, for Rorty, neutral as far as distinguishing between animals and humans goes, but allows for differences in complexity and richness of one culture versus another. Older, and unhelpful, definitions often run together in our understanding of the term, according to Rorty, are gathered in culture2, which refers to a special virtue that can be acquired through education and 'high' pursuits such as abstract thought, music, the arts, and so on, and culture3: 'what supposedly has steadily gained ground, as history has gone along, over "nature"-over what we share with brutes' (pp. 188-9; cf. also Baerveldt & Voestermans, 2000 , for a discussion of the 19th-century view in which 'culture' and 'civilization' are confused).
THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13 (5) 638 Rorty gets out of any evaluative dilemma vis-à-vis specific cultures and their adaptive abilities by coining the (purportedly Deweyan) notion 'that what survives survives'-whether we talk genes or memes (the latter a fashionable term meant to express the cultural counterpart to genes; cf. Blackmore, 1999) . The point of philosophical pragmatism/pragmaticism (or neo-pragmatism, rather, to distinguish it from Peirce's, James' and Dewey's earlier versions-cf. Innis, 1994) can be discerned in the following:
. . . to speak of the 'survival of the fittest' is merely to say, tautologously, that what survives survives. It is not to suggest that there is something outside the struggles of genes and memes that provides a criterion by which to sort out the good outcomes from bad outcomes. (Rorty, 1998, p. 191) .
That is to say, no Forms, Reality, God, or whatever, that can be thought to embody somehow a final arbiter that functions outside the struggle to survive; all that counts is the ability to cope through a set of shared habits of action, those that enable members of a single community to get along with one another and with the surrounding environment.
The point of this brief foray into Rorty's philosophical position, that which motivates his definition of culture, is to underline specific problems we have with culture, problems that could be avoided if we were to take a more pragmatic line. In other words, it might very well be that certain (too often hidden) philosophical assumptions push our conceptualization in psychology in the wrong direction (e.g. opposing body and mind, culture and the individual, and what is 'in' and 'outside' the brain/mind). Attention to these assumptions is therefore called for if we are to fix the package, which we bring to bear on the study of action.
According to Rorty, then, rationality1 and culture1 are merely names for our coping and survival patterns-patterns that indicate something about the history of members of a group's interaction with each other and within a particular context over time. This is the neo-pragmatist approach to things at its clearest-no other-worldly criterion for Truth, Goodness, Beauty, or such, against which to measure the coping and survival of an organism in context; also, no ultimate standard against which to find certain patterns of coping and survival wanting. If we follow Rorty along this neo-pragmatic route, specifically in so far as our notions of culture go, we will probably gain more rationality3 or tolerance of the differences between us. Outside of this neo-pragmatist stance, we tend to give too much weight to a muddled sense of culture (e.g. one in which we run together different senses of the term; and where we conceive of some cultures as more rational than others) and, as such, come to view the differences between us as more important and essential than they are. This stance might also prevent some of 'us' (or 'them') to feel more or less cheated when particular beliefs and practices survive and others do not: for example, when 'western' science gets the upper hand, globally, over 'indigenous' knowledge. I do not take this further here (cf. Craig, 2001) .
Advocating that we adopt a definition such as Rorty's is, however, not to say 'that psychologists should omit cultural processes from consideration in their theoretical or empirical work', plainly because it cannot be omitted from the study of action. Our doings and identities are indisputably and unchangeably cultural, and the products of creatures with private, public or shared and official histories. The difficulty is to find a research framework that will allow us to examine the parts of this whole; a framework that will also contribute to making our work more sensitive to the demands of different contexts of communication, or contexts of interaction, and the performances thus disallowed or allowed by each (e.g. the laboratory versus free or natural contexts).
To repeat: culture has become both a political and epistemic problem, but for good reasons. We are nowadays sensitized to the demands of 'others' and wary of concepts that deny differences and exclude particular people. I presented Rorty's definition of culture because I believe it allows for a research programme in psychology that avoids the muddles discussed in section 1(a), above.
Proposals for a Research Programme
Psychologically speaking, we want to find a way of handling patterns in our data such as the following: 'Children from poor and/or nonwhite homes disproportionally score at below-average levels, often in the retarded ranges, on tests that purport to measure intelligence' (Budoff, 1987 , p. 52)-handling, though, without using culture, class, and so on, to set up the basis for the comparison and then to produce explanations that cannot carry the weight placed on them. 4 In other words, we do not want our data generation and explanations to depend on dubious notions about homogeneous and unchanging populations regarding the actions or performances of individual members. Moreover, we do not want these to depend on a priori separation between culture and psychological processes-as if they were different kinds of actions. In what follows, I discuss conceptual, methodological and theoretical moves appropriate to this task.
(a) Conceptual Moves
Given new ideas about ourselves, social scientists are compelled to rethink the concepts they use habitually before attempting to make these do empirical work (as independent or quasi-independent variables), or before theorizing these as we see in the seven theories of culture discussed by Cooper and Denner. This is sound philosophical practice, but perhaps too THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13 (5) 640 often neglected by psychologists. (This was a point made by Harré and Secord [1972] long ago.) Above, I introduced Rorty's (neo-pragmatic) conceptual analysis of culture because I believe it offers useful guidelines for empirical research, quite apart from its other failings regarding different projects about ourselves (cf. Craig, 1997) . This analysis of the term 'culture' seems particularly useful for the task at hand because it leads us to think about culture as an empirical question, that is, what indeed (if any) are the shared habits of action among the subjects within a particular subjectpopulation under study. It might also function as a theory and, as such, be open to continuous empirical examination.
Similar work is required for psychological processes/mechanisms. For example, the traditional views on mind (Kantian-and Cartesian-inspired models), which tend to place psychological processes somewhere 'inside' the skull, removed from the body, words and world, are increasingly being questioned (cf. Clark, 1999; Hutchins, 1995; Rowlands, 1999) . When we stop thinking about psychological phenomena as occurring 'in' the mind/ brain of an individual (cf. the strange notion of 'individual meanings' in the quotation from Cooper and Denner included above), and culture as 'outside' the individual, we also stop wanting to place these on either sides of a dichotomy.
Human actions do not come ready-labelled as either culture or psychological processes. We-researchers on or thinkers about people's beliefs, habits or actions-choose which framework or even equation to impose, or where what should go, depending on our insights. For example, theories such as those that attempt to link culture and psychology do not question the very nature of the relation imposed, but merely tinker on one or the other side of the equation purportedly linking culture and psychological phenomena. When our theories change (e.g. from a Kantian and Cartesian view of mind to a distributed, extended or situated view of cognition), we also change our attention to what is before us and, as such, the frameworks, concepts and categories that we create. On the basis of these analyses, I want to propose that what we have before us, empirically speaking, is action-incontext (also subject-in-context; task-in-context), 5 if the experimentally minded will ignore, for the moment, these 'hyphenated barbarisms'. We now turn to accessing this complex-action-in-context-methodologically.
(b) Methodological Moves
Shifting our empirical and theoretical tools to action-in-context, as such, motivates an analysis of the resources [r] and constraints [c] operating in the situation (cf. Gibson's notion of 'affordances', as discussed by Clark, 1997; Rowlands, 1999, pp. 208-209) .
6 Phrased differently, once we stop trying to find empirical instances of (instantiate) dubious concepts, and shift our attention onto the complex of possibilities before us, we are also inclined to CRAIG: CULTURE AND THE INDIVIDUAL 641 look for that which is offered, furnished or provided by the environment. I propose to call these the resources (advantages/benefits, or positive affordances) and constraints (disadvantages/costs, or negative affordances) available in the situation for action.
The resources and constraints (hereafter r & c) could then be explicated in terms of the purpose of the study, the task under examination and the parts (e.g. participants, tools) making up the whole complex. What I want to make clear at this point is that, with each new purpose to the design of a context, a new picture of the r & c complex unfolds. Say the task involves tool-using and, say, the total situation includes: a subject in a cage; a particular stick within reach; and a bunch of bananas further than an arm's (but within an arm + a stick's) reach from the enclosure in which the subject is. An objective (descriptive analysis, much like that undertaken by behaviourists 7 ) could then be undertaken in order to note the parts and also the interaction between these (cf. Nagell, Olguin & Tomasello, 1993 , for an example of this kind of study). If the purpose is the comparison of the actions of one group versus another (say adult primates versus 6-year-old human children), the r & c that operate similarly among members of one group, and different from the other, will form the focus of analysis.
For example, the stick might be too heavy to handle and thus to use as a tool for the children and, as such, will not be a resource. And if, in another set-up, programmed forklifts are introduced as subjects, the bananas might function as a constraint in that these will be squashed by the interaction of machine and stick, and so forth. The point is that any part of the whole (action-in-context) becomes either a resource or a constraint. Depending on the purpose (e.g. to describe and explain the use of tools), the task (e.g. to move the bananas into the cage, without squashing them) and the interacting parts (e.g. mature primate, human child, forklift, the available tools, the environment [cage], etc.), an analysis of the r & c operating can be undertaken. How fine-grained to set up the data for analysis-'vertically', as in including different categories/subjects/variables, and 'horizontally', meaning the refinement in any one of these, that is, various characteristics of the categories/subjects/variables included-obviously depends on the aim of the project: In addition, the standard social scientific practices, such as the operationalization of each element, apply. I specify the explanation of the data thus generated more precisely for (i) task, (ii) participant(s) and (iii) r & c, below.
The point I want to make here is: the data thus produced (e.g. for a comparison of tool-use among primates, forklifts and human children) shift the explanation from the overly general (e.g. individual abilities) to the specific (r & c interaction), but always in view of a particular context (i.e. participant [s] , task, purpose).
We now turn to what to do with, say, a number of patterns discerned in THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13 (5) 642 empirical data such as can be gained from the objective description of the distributed resources and constraints on action.
(c) Theoretical Moves
In our analysis of r & c, as above, we will begin to discern patterns in the data. This calls forth the work of theory and, in the name of a scientific psychology, the task of turning our conclusions into hypotheses for further empirical scrutiny. This ongoing productive cycle, where as many as possible of our conclusions (explanations/theories) are turned into empirical hypotheses, is, as I would argue, what the scientific study of action requires (cf. Wolpert, 1992) . As such, the work of science (i.e. the ongoing attempt to demonstrate or justify and ratify claims) becomes the test, if you like, of our provisional conclusions. In these terms, culture might very well serve as the name of a theory purportedly explaining patterns in the data generated as in 2(b), above. As such, this theory, like any other, is open to ongoing scrutiny in the name of science.
I will call the work of theory any abstraction made of two or more descriptions or, higher up on the abstraction ladder, explanations, by way of placing these into some coherent answer to a 'why' or 'what' question (so that 'theory' and 'explanation', on certain points, are synonymous, the former usually having a larger scope). In this sense, 'fruit' can be thought of as the name of a low-level theory of apples, pears, grapes, and so on, and, similarly, 'culture', like 'fruit', is already an abstraction and, as such, a lowlevel theory. Moreover, because a theory is not empirically observable, as such, it becomes our scientific task to turn this into an hypothesis. In our analysis thus far, this means that we are committed to ask: what are the r & c operating in the context such that 'the set of shared habits of action' of specific groups invariably function as either a resource or constraint in view of a particular task (e.g. all human children try to reach the bananas without use of the available tool)? Only further analysis could then substantiate culture as a viable theory or explanation of the patterns in the data. As such, the work of theory, as regards the study of action, also means that we must acknowledge different kinds of abstraction (e.g. biological, historical, psychological), where no one of these in particular rules out, in principle, any one of the others. At best, we can expect some inter-theoretic reduction between theories as our knowledge changes for the better (cf. Bickle, 1996) . Furthermore, we have to note that an analysis of the interaction between r & c does not give us the rich narrative of character, life or those experiences so wonderfully expressed in the novel and art generally. What they do promise, though, is a way out of persistent problems such as finding that IQ tests predict performances on other, similar tasks and tests, but do not transfer very well to so-called 'real-life' contexts (cf. Sternberg & Kaufman, 1998, p. 494) . Subjective or, more precisely, phenomenological analyses, as well as the work of art, generally, cannot be ruled out, in principle, when we think about people (and surely other animals too): their doings, and what they suffer. These are, at best, expressions of who we are and how we cope that make the particular so seemingly universal in its interpretation and application, and empirical psychology so impoverished in comparison (cf. Craig, 1999) . These rich narratives do not, however, indicate precise empirical handles on the positive or negative contribution of each part of the whole complex. In this regard, a focus on r & c operating in a situation presents a solution, but not a conclusion that rules out further enrichment.
If I am right in so far as the discussion goes, then it is in order to suggest that our psychological theories about patterns in empirical data would best be guided by the following analytic moves or theoretical frames:
(i) The demands of the task. This requires an analysis of the operations required by the task in its own (or ideal) terms. For example, the task of writing with a pencil on paper involves (among other things) specific handeye co-ordination and use of/placement in three-dimensional space (cf. Kirsh, 1996 , for a useful distinction in this regard between actions that are external versus those that are internal to a task). It is also worth noting that all tasks have a social history, something too often overlooked in comparing different groups' performances on a particular task. It is therefore important to note that a task might be part (or not) of particular subjects' habitual repertoire, that is, culture1 (or not). When a task is part of subjects' history, their shared habits of action will therefore function as a resource vis-à-vis successful task completion.
(ii) What the participant(s) bring(s) to the task. This has to do with an explication of the subject's operations on a task, in context; operations that are manifest in his/her habitual actions (cf. culture1, above) and/or spontaneous actions (cf. Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith's [1999] work on the unique abilities, or the spontaneous actions, of those suffering from Williams Syndrome). In terms of the proposal for research discussed here, any of these (habitual or spontaneous actions) could function as a resource or constraint on successful task completion. In this regard, work on explicating a participant's innate, or domain-and task-specific, abilities fits into this level of analysis (cf. Spelke, 1994) .
(iii) The resources and constraints operating in the situation. This has to do with the way in which actions are allowed/generated (or not), or the specific manner in which the task demands, habitual actions (or 'shared habits of action') and spontaneous actions (or innate endowment) configure a complex system of resources and constraints, in context. (A system, moreover, where mathematical modelling of complex systems might, in most cases, be more apt than the standard fare of psychological research, statistical correlation; cf. Beer, 2000) .
Note how, in the above, if culture and psychological processes are anywhere, they are inextricably 'in' the context and 'in' actions. This, then, puts the lie to the old equation introduced above, y = f (x), as far as attempts to link culture and psychological processes go. On a more abstract level, action may very well be constrained and/or resourced by social history (e.g. the nature of the task), biological capacities (e.g. the level of maturity of the subject) and individual capacities (e.g. regarding habitual actions, capacities for adaptations to the demands of the situation, or for redesign of the environment). The issue that I am pressing is: how any one of these (e.g. social history) shows itself in terms of the r & c configuration in a particular context is an empirical matter. That is to say, answers to questions about that which generates the patterns will be determined by the level of analysis (explanatory focus). For example, it is on the facts associated with the primate's use of the stick to get to the bananas that (theoretical) conclusions are reached about their species-capacities for problem solving; capacities as hypotheses for ongoing research (cf. Köhler, 1925 Köhler, /1999 .
I want to suggest, therefore, that a better way to think about culture and psychology is to think of these in terms of resources and/or constraints, distributed across a context, operating in task-specific terms. In this way, we are led, slowly but more surely, from questions to answers or small-scale theories and, perhaps, further on to bigger stories about who we are and how we cope; but whatever we do, theoretically speaking, cannot be called linking culture and psychology. Those still attached to separating and/or linking culture and psychological processes will ask: what if we compare performances on a task and find that all primates, Dutch scholars or women, and so on, perform the same and different from humans, Hungarian scholars or men, and so on? Does this not show that we have a cultural distinction and thus a relationship between culture and psychological processes? Here the answer must be that if this is indeed the finding, as already pointed out above, then, clearly, we have a provisional answer, which could be termed 'culture'; one that will, at best, be turned into an empirical hypothesis for further study. What such a pattern does not, however, imply is a dichotomy between culture and psychological phenomena, as I have been at pains to point out in section 1, above.
Conclusion
Typically, culture is used, psychologically speaking, by calling on subjects from different locales, speaking different languages, or who seem, in some CRAIG: CULTURE AND THE INDIVIDUAL supposing that this is all there is to do, and that, invariably, the stimulus comes from the environment and the response from the individual. Moreover, I certainly do not want to deny mediating inner states altogether.
